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Abstract
Minimum capital requirements are often implemented under the notion that increased capi-
tal improves bank safety and stability. However, an unintended consequence of higher capital
requirements could arise if increasing capital induces banks to invest in riskier assets. Several
researchers have examined this relationship between bank capital and risk among conven-
tional banks, and interest around this topic has intensified since the 2007-2008 financial
crisis. However, the findings are rather mixed. Moreover, very few studies have focused on
Islamic banks, which differ greatly from their conventional counterpart’s due to their need
to be Shariah-compliant. In this paper a sample of 22 Islamic banks is analyzed over a seven
year period from 2007-2013. The empirical approach is fully parametric and Bayesian utiliz-
ing techniques developed by Kessler and Munkin (2015) and building on previous banking
research by Shrives and Dahl (1992) and Jacques and Nigro (1997). Some evidence is found
suggesting that increases in total capital positively affect the levels of asset risks among
Islamic banks.
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1 Introduction
Banks maintain a minimum capital requirement because it provides a bu¤er against negative
shocks and acts as insurance against the risk of insolvency. However, the nancial crisis of
20072008 exposed the fact that many of the worlds largest banks held insu¢ cient capital
and were not able to cover all of their losses. This apparent mismatch between the minimum
regulatory capital requirementand its resulting impact on bank solvencyhas promoted an
intense debate among policymakers, bankers, and academics on the question: how much capital
should banks hold in order to cover their potential losses? In most countries, the minimum
capital requirement is 8% of risk-weighted assets, and is expected to increase to 10.5% under
the Basel III accord (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010).1 As of today, the debate
is still active on how much capital banks should hold.
Capital requirement can be a double-edged sword. While increased capital enhances bank
safety, it might induce a bank to assume greater risks. If the latter e¤ect outweighs the former,
even well-capitalized banks may face the risk of insolvency. There is a large literature in nancial
economics studying the relationship between risk-taking and the capitalization of banks. The
theoretical literature suggests that risk and capital decisions are simultaneously determined
and interrelated.2 For instance, Gennotte and Pyle (1991) show that an increase in the capital
requirement may induce a bank to simultaneously decrease the size of its portfolio and increase
its asset risk in hopes of earning higher returns. Diamond and Rajan (2000) o¤er a model that
simultaneously rationalizes the asset and the liability sides of banks. They show that while
greater capital reduces the probability of nancial distress, it also reduces liquidity creation.
The empirical literature focuses on testing various predictions of the banking theory with data
primarily from the United States and Europe. Conversely, in this paper we examine the nancial
decisions made by Islamic banks and whether they di¤er from their conventional counterparts.
A brief overview of the empirical studies is provided in the next section.
The minimum capital requirements recommended by the Basel Committee apply for conven-
tional banks and do not make any allowance for Islamic banks. However, the Islamic Financial
Services Board (IFSB), the Islamic equivalent of the Basel Committee, is responsible for set-
ting regulatory standards that are in par with Basel standards for conventional banks. The
1Table 1 provides an overview of the capital requirements under Basel II and Basel III.
2The literature is vast and comes to contradicting results. For a survey of the theoretical and empirical
literature, see Stolz (2007).
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Basel rules on capital adequacy ratio(CAR) have become the cornerstone of safety in modern
banking. A banks CAR is computed by dividing the total capital by total risk-weighted assets.
However, unlike their conventional counterparts, dening the denominator (i.e., risk-weighted
assets) of the CAR for Islamic banks is not straightforward.3 This is because of the unique
risk prole Islamic banks have with respect to their products and services, which need to be
Shariah-compliant. For instance, in the case of nancing projects using the prot-sharing in-
vestment accounts (PSIAs) contracts (e.g., the Mudharabah and Wakala investment accounts),
Islamic banks are reluctant to share losses with their customers because of the fear that disap-
pointed customers might move their funds elsewhere. Thus, although PSIAs provide a bu¤er in
theory, in practice Islamic banks are very sensitive to displaced commercial risk. Furthermore,
the higher the level of PSIAs in the capital structure is, the higher are the agency (monitor-
ing) costs faced by Islamic banks. All else equal, higher agency costs will reduce the banks
expected return on assets, which in turn might induce them to increase the riskiness of their
portfolios after the imposition of capital requirements (Besanko and Kanatas, 1996; Muljawan
et al., 2002).
Islamic banks also face higher liquidity risk than conventional banks because of the dom-
inance of asset-based nancing and lack of short-term traditional instruments like repurchase
agreements and certicates of deposit. The lumpy nature of asset-based nancing makes it
di¢ cult for Islamic banks to exit from these transactions in times of emergency. Indeed, prior
to the global nancial crisis nearly half of Islamic banksassets were backed or linked to real
estate, and were therefore slashed following the burst of the real estate bubble in the Gulf Co-
operation Council (GCC) countries (Al Monayea, 2012). Furthermore, although market, credit,
and operational risks are easy to measure according to the specic rules of Pillar I of the Basel
II/III, other aspects of risks that are also important to Islamic banks, such as liquidity, concen-
tration of funding, and duciary risks are examined in a more subjective manner under Pillar
II (Al Monayea, 2012). These risks, which are uniquely important for Islamic banks, make it a
challenging task to calculate risk-weighted assets and the resulting capital adequacy ratios cited
in the rules of Basel II/III (Ariss and Sarieddine, 2007).
Against the backdrop of Islamic bankscapital bu¤ers to unique risks, we examine the e¤ect
of changes in total capital on asset risks for 22 Islamic banks over the period of 2007 through
3A recent survey of Islamic bankers suggests that a number of di¤erent practices are used to adjust the
denominator of the CAR formula (Song and Oosthuizen, 2014).
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2013. The relationship between bank capital and risk has gathered pace since the 20072008
nancial crisis, and a debate has developed over how to prevent a reprise of the recent nancial
crisis.4 However, compared to conventional banks, existing evidence on the relationship between
capital and risk among Islamic banks is lacking or, at best, slowly emerging. There is, therefore,
a need for empirical analysis of the capital-risk relationship to ll the void in the Islamic banking
literature.
The empirical tests of bank capital and bank risk, however, are marred by issues of simul-
taneity biases (i.e., endogeneity) because the level of capital and the amount of risk that a bank
can undertake are interdependent (see, e.g., Gennotte and Pyle, 1991; Diamond and Rajan,
2000). In addition, risk and capital are functionally related to each other through the presence
of risk-weighted assets in both denitions. To account for the endogeneity between risk and
capital, most existing studies have considered traditional simultaneous equation methods such
as two- or three-stage least squares (2SLS/3SLS) estimators.
Our empirical model builds on the approach employed by Shrives and Dahl (1992) and
Jacques and Nigro (1997) who utilize a simultaneous equation framework in order to study the
e¤ects of new bank regulations on commercial banks in developed countries. However, our paper
di¤ers from earlier studies in that we follow the method proposed by Kessler and Munkin (2015),
who developed an endogenous treatment estimation procedure for a panel data simultaneous
equation model. As will be elaborated below, this procedure has a number of advantages over the
2SLS/3SLS estimators. Furthermore, we rely on a Bayesian method to estimate the models
parameters, thereby allowing for model parameters to assume random distributions. Banks
di¤er in preferences for risk, uncertainty, and capitalization, which might eventually result in a
systematic variation in risk parameters across banks (Firestone and Rezende, 2013). However,
to date, there has been insu¢ cient attention to potential distributional variation of parameters
in the literature on bank capital and risk. Accounting for this is important in making empirical
claims and specic suggestions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the
theoretical and empirical literature, with particular attention to empirical studies on the risk-
capital relationship under Islamic banking. Section 3 discusses model specication and outlines
its estimation. Section 4 presents the empirical results and Section 5 concludes the paper.
Steps of the Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm are given in Appendix 1
4See the collection of articles in Danielsson (2015) for a glimpse of this debate.
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and a numerical example where the data generating process is known and consistent with the
introduced model is presented in Appendix 2.
2 Related Literature
A large body of theoretical literature on how banks adjust their holdings after an increase in
the minimum regulatory capital requirements sends mixed signals, predicting that bank capital
and risk are both negatively and positively related. For example, Koehn and Santomero (1980)
predict a higher risk of failure for the banking industry after a forced increase in capital, because
banks will reduce their risk exposure and therefore lower the expected returns to their portfolio.
Similarly, Furlong and Keeley (1989) argue that stronger capital requirements actually reduce
the gains of holding riskier assets, and therefore dissuade banks from increasing the riskiness
of their asset portfolios. Conversely, Milne and Whalley (2001) show that following an increase
in regulatory capital, banks rst increase capital and decrease asset risk but as soon as they
obtain a desired capital bu¤er, both capital and risk may become positively related.
A few studies have theoretically analyzed the risk-capital relationship for Islamic banks.
Al Deehani et al. (1999) demonstrate that because Islamic banks rely extensively on the use
of investment accounts for nancing, they can increase both their market value and portfolio
returns without increasing the banks risk. This contradicts Modigliani-Millers irrelevance
theorem, which states that the market value of a rm is una¤ected by how the rm is nanced.
They also nd support for their theory in a sample of 12 international Islamic banks. Muljawan
et al. (2002) argue that the Islamic banks should maintain adequate capital bu¤ers to cushion
against the risk emanating from the inherent agency problems associated with PSIA contracts.
However, Toumi et al. (2012) argue that agency conicts are far less important for Islamic
banks than for their conventional counterparts, since speculation and excessive risk taking are
prohibited in Islamic nance.
An early empirical contribution testing the hypothesis of whether banks increase or decrease
asset risk when faced with higher capital requirements is in Shrieves and Dahl (1992). They
show that risk exposure and capital levels are simultaneously related, and that the majority
of banks mitigate the e¤ects of increases in capital levels by increasing asset risk posture, and
vice versa. Subsequently, Jacques and Nigro (1997) modied the framework used in Shrieves
and Dahl (1992) by employing a three-stage least squares model in order to recognize the
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relationship between bank capital, portfolio risk, and the risk-based capital standards. In
contrast to Shrieves and Dahl (1992), their results suggest that the risk-based capital standards
were e¤ective in increasing capital ratios and reducing portfolio risk in conventional commercial
banks. These two studies used data on US commercial banks for their empirical analysis. Rime
(2001) provided similar evidence for Switzerland, indicating that regulatory requirements led
banks to increase their levels of capital but did not a¤ect their level of risk.
Several studies also document an inverse relationship between bank capital and risk (e.g.,
Das and Ghosh, 2004; Stolz, 2007; Ahmad et al., 2009). For example, based on supervisory
micro data for German savings and cooperative banks, Stolz (2007) nds that for banks with
low capital bu¤ers, adjustments in capital and risk are negatively related. Whereas, capital and
risk tend to be positively related for banks with high capital bu¤ers.
Fast forward to recent years, the nancial crisis of 200708 has brought renewed interest
to the study of risk and capital among commercials banks. Kochubey and Kowalczyk (2014)
analyze the simultaneous relationship between capital, risk, and liquidity decisions among US
commercial banks from 2001 to 2009. They nd that during the pre-crisis period short-term
adjustments in bank capital inversely a¤ect short-term adjustments in bank risk and vice versa.
However, during the nancial crisis lower risk implies higher capital, but higher capital induces
more risk taking. Tanda (2015) provides a review of the main empirical research on the impact
of regulation on capital and risk.
All of the aforementioned papers concern conventional commercial banks, which are based
in developed countries. There are only a few studies that focus on Islamic banks. Hussain and
Hassan (2005) found that, similar to conventional banks, when capital regulations are imposed
undercapitalized Islamic banks are forced to increase capital. However, they did not nd any
evidence of Islamic banks increasing risk in their asset portfolio, even though they adjusted to
higher capital requirements. Ghosh (2014) nds that in response to regulatory pressure Islamic
banks increase their capital more than conventional banks, and also increased their risk as their
capital rose.
Lately, a few studies have analyzed the e¤ects of the nancial crisis on the relative perfor-
mance of Islamic banks. For example, Bourkhis and Nabi (2013) found that the global nancial
crisis a¤ected the Islamic banks no di¤erently than their conventional counterparts. Their re-
sults echo the ndings of a famous study by Beck et al. (2013), who also found no noticeable
di¤erence between Islamic and conventional banksprotability and stability (z-scores) in nor-
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mal times, during local crises, or during the global nancial crisis.5 Although distinguished,
these papers did not address the question of how the global nancial crisis has impacted the
relationship between bank capital and asset risk in the context of Islamic banks.
3 Model
This section opens with a description of the simultaneous equations model developed by Shrieves
and Dahl (1992) and later modied by Jacques and Nigro (1997). We further modify their model
in order to address the econometrics challenges associated with the main economic question
under consideration. The original model employs observed changes in the measures of bank
capital and risk levels, dened respectively as capital adequacy ratios (CAR) and the credit risk
ratio (RISK) using the following formulas:
CAR =
TC
RWA
(1)
RISK =
RWA
TA
where TC measures total capital and is comprised primarily of Tier 1 capital,6 TA measures
total bank assets, and RWA measures risk-weighted assets.7 Finally, risk is measured as the
ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets.
In any period, banks may not be able to adjust their desired capital and risk levels instan-
taneously and therefore the observed levels of these dependent variables may deviate from the
target levels which are not observable, but are assumed to depend upon some set of observable
variables. This gives rise to a model in which simultaneity of the dependent variables is coupled
with exogenous covariates. The model is specied in terms of changes over time as
CARit = 1RISKit +Xit1 + Z1it1 + "1it; (2)
RISKit = 2CARit +Xit2 + Z2it2 + "2it; (3)
5 It should be noted here that their study found some signicant di¤erence between the two banking models.
See Beck et al. (2013) for further details.
6Due to the prohibition of interest payments, only a small part of Tier II capital (e.g. impairment and
deductible allowance) is used by Islamic banks. As a result, Islamic banks already meet the enhanced quality
of capitalprovision under Basel III.
7Banks calculate their risk-weighted assets by rst assigning their assets to the appropriate risk-weight category
(ranging from 0% to 100% for most assets, but up to 200% for some mortgage exposures and 600% for certain
equity exposures), and then summing the dollar value of each asset multiplied by its corresponding risk weight
(Jacques and Nigro, 1997; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2012).
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where
CARit = CARit   CARit 1;
RISKit = RISKit  RISKit 1;
and where Xit is a set of exogenous variables, Z1it and Z2it are exclusion restrictions which
include the lagged values CARit 1 and RISKit 1 respectively, and "1it and "2it are the idio-
syncratic error terms. Note, that these equations do not include individual specic e¤ects as
dened by Jacques and Nigro (1997). The underlying assumption is that this model is linear
and the individual specic e¤ects get eliminated by taking the rst di¤erences. This model is
not robust to misspecication of linearity in which case controlling for individual specic e¤ects
is still necessary even for the di¤erenced model.
Our modication of this model is partially driven by the following concerns:
1. The two dependent variables as dened by (1) are not only related, but they are function-
ally dependent of one another through the presence of RWA: In a statistical sense, this
might be an additional or even the only reason for CAR and RISK to simultaneously
a¤ect each other. Therefore, the two stage lease squares (2SLS) and the three stage least
squares (3SLS) methods are utilized in Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and Jacques and Nigro
(1997) to establish a linear relationship between two inversely related variables where the
linear relationship might not even exist.
2. The way these two dependent variables, CAR and RISK, are dened makes it di¢ cult
if not impossible to identify a proper causal relationship between total capital and asset
risks. For example, a bank under the regulation constraint can improve its capital ratio
by, say, moving its assets from safer long term Treasury bonds to short term higher
risk commercial loans with higher potential returns. Such a substitution would increase
asset risks while its required capital level would decrease, which may result in a negative
correlation between changes in capital and changes in risk. However, this correlation is a
result of the shifts in the structure of bank assets, and would not mean that in general
increasing capital would lead to lower risks.
3. Finally, the 2SLS and 3SLS estimation procedures rely on proper exclusion restrictions.
However, since the dependent variables are related through RWA it is di¢ cult to defend
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any potential instrument that would a¤ect the measure of risk but would not a¤ect the
capital adequacy ratio since RWA enters into both denitions. Therefore, identication
would rely on the lagged dependent variables as the instruments which would not be
valid in the rst di¤erence model specication where variables CARit and RISKit
technically depend on the lagged variables CARit 1 and RISKit 1.
The objective of our study is to identify the treatment e¤ect of total capital on the risks of
bank assets. Therefore, we propose two alternative measures of total capital and risk which, as
we argue, are more appropriate for our analysis:
TcTa =
TC
TA
RwaTa =
RWA
TA
Instead of a simultaneous model in which both dependent variables a¤ect each other we specify
an endogenous treatment model to study the e¤ect of total capital on the levels of risks of
bank assets. After the nancial crisis Islamic banks in our data set enjoyed unusually large
increases in the levels of total assets and total capital. Our assumption is that a great share of
those increases are exogenously determined by global factors rather than a¤ected by endogenous
determinants at the bank level. Therefore, the specied model is
y1it = 1y2it +Xit1 + Z1it1 + 1i + "1it; (4)
y2it = Xit2 + Z2it2 + 2i + "2it; (5)
i = 1; :::N; t = 1; :::; T:
where y1it is the dependent variable RwaTait, and y2it is the potentially endogenous treatment
variable TcTait, Xit is a set of exogenous variables which are the same for both equations,
Z1it and Z2it are exclusion restrictions which include RwaTait 1 and TcTait 1 respectively,
and 1i and 2i are the individual specic random e¤ects which are distributed normally as
1i
i:i:d: N  0; 21 and 2i i:i:d: N  0; 22. Finally
("1it; "2it)
0 i:i:d: N

(0; 0)0 ;
X
;
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where X
=
0B@ 21 12
12 
2
2
1CA :
The correlation parameter 12 allows for potential endogeneity of the treatment variable. To
allow for greater exibility and robustness to model misspecication we include the individual
specic random e¤ects. Instead of using changes in the dependent variables as in (2) and (3)
we use the actual levels. Without loss of generality we can use the level variables in our model,
provided that the lagged variables are included on the right hand sides of equations (4) and (5) :
Our estimation approach is fully parametric and Bayesian, and we use MCMC methods,
specically the Gibbs sampler, to estimate the posterior distribution of the model parameters
(see Geman and Geman, 1984).
In order to simplify the MCMC algorithm we decompose the joint bivariate normal distri-
bution of ("1it; "2it) as the conditional distribution "1itj"2it i:i:d: N (12"2it; 1) and the marginal
distribution "2it
i:i:d: N (0; 2) where
1 = 
2
1  
212
22
;
2 = 
2
2;
12 =
12
22
:
There is a one-to-one correspondence between the set of parameters
 
21; 12; 
2
2

and (1; 12; 2).
Further we divide all of the parameters into the following blocks
1 = [1; 1; 1; 12];
2 = [2; 2; 2];
and
21 ; 
2
2 ; 1; 2:
The corresponding data are denoted as
W1it = [y2it; Xit; Z1it; "2it];
W2it = [y1it; Xit; Z2it];
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and are assigned the following conjugate priors:
1  N
 
1;H
 1
1

;
2  N
 
2;H
 1
2

;
12  N(12;H 112)
21  IG(a1 ; b1);
22  IG(a2 ; b2);
1  IG (a1 ; b1) ;
2  IG (a2 ; b2) :
Then the full posterior density can be written as a product of the likelihood function
NY
i=1
TY
t=1
1p
2j1j1=2
exp
 :5 11 (y1it  W1it1   1i   12 (y2it  W2it2   2i))2
NY
i=1
TY
t=1
1p
2j2j1=2
exp
 :5 12 (y2it  W2it2   2i)2
NY
i=1
1p
21
exp[ :501i 21 1i]
NY
i=1
1p
22
exp[ :502i 22 2i]
and the prior distributions for all of the parameters outlined above (i.e., 1; 2; 21 ; 
2
2 ; 1; 2):
The steps of the MCMC procedure are derived as a combination of the Gibbs sampler with
data augmentation (Tanner and Wong, 1987), and are outlined in Appendix 1. A Monte Carlo
simulation, showing that the proposed MCMC algorithm produces reliable estimates is presented
in Appendix 2.
4 Application
A data set for 22 Islamic banks was derived from the Bankscope Data Base for the period from
2007 to 2013. Since we use lagged variables the actual number of observations for our analysis
is reduced by one year for each bank which totals to 22 times 6 or 132 observations. With only
132 observations, the xed e¤ects model could potentially su¤er from the problem of having
to estimate too many parameters most of which would be nuisance xed e¤ects parameters.
Therefore, our choice is the random e¤ects model. We estimate the endogenous treatment
random e¤ects panel data model for the endogenous treatment variable TcTa; which is dened
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as the ratio of total capital (Tier 1 and Tier 2) over total assets, and the dependent variable
RwaTa; which is dened as the ratio of risk-weighted assets over total assets. More specically
the model is
RwaTait = 1TcTait +Xit1 + Z1it1 + 1i + "1it; (6)
TcTait = Xit2 + Z2it2 + 2i + "2it: (7)
The set of exogenous variables Xit is the same for both equations. It includes the ratio of total
equity to total assets TeTait and the ratio of bank loans to total assets LoanTait.
Variables Z1it and Z2it are the exclusion restrictions including RwaTait 1 and TcTait 1
respectively. Additionally Z1it includes the lagged ratio of nonperforming loans (i.e. the total
amount of loans in default) to total asset NonTait 1: Variable Z2it also includes the banks
operating income which is dened as the lagged average return on assets ROAAit 1. These
two variables NonTait 1 and ROAAit 1 have been previously used as exclusion restrictions
by other studies including Zhang et al. (2008). Even though the validity of these instruments
can be questioned we follow the existing literature. Another common variable to include is
the natural log of total assets, however, in the case of our model specication the endogenous
variables are already normalized by TA. The means and standard deviation of the variables
used in the analysis are given in Table 2. The summary statistics are given for the entire time
period and for each year. It can be noticed that total assets, total capital, and risk-weighted
assets display unusually high increases from 2009 to 2010. We argue that this could be reection
of a substitution e¤ect with some customers potentially moving their accounts and deposits to
Islamic banks after the 20072008 global nancial crisis.
Random variables 1i and 2i; the individual specic random e¤ects, are assumed to be
normally distributed as 1i
i:i:d: N  0; 21 and 2i i:i:d: N  0; 22. In the specication of the
random e¤ects model the random e¤ects are not allowed to be correlated with the regressors but
in practice they could be. Therefore, we have tried alternative model specications including
a Chamberlain adjustment model, whereby the relationship between the random e¤ects and
explanatory variables are formalized through a distributional assumption. However, we nd
that this adjustment would not lead to e¢ ciency gains. In addition, the Chamberlains adjust-
ment does not produce any evidence of the random e¤ects being correlated with the regressors
(the results are available upon request). Therefore, we concentrate our analysis on the more
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straightforward random e¤ects model specication.
We choose proper priors for all parameters and, in fact, very tight priors for the variance
parameters as it is known that assigning loose priors to the covariance parameters of the random
e¤ects panel data could result in an improper posterior:
1  N (0;10I) ;
2  N (0;10I) ;
12  N (0; 10) ;
21  IG(3; 50);
22  IG(3; 50);
1  IG (3; 50) ;
2  IG (3; 50) :
The posterior means and standard deviations of the parameters of the estimated model are
reported in Table 3. The results are based on Markov chains run for 20,000 replications after
discarding the rst 5,000 draws of the burn-in-phase. The chains display very good convergence
properties.
It is interesting to note that the e¤ects of the year dummies are insignicant. This is
surprising since the dependent variables in the summary statistics display a changing dynamic
especially when comparing values before and after the nancial crisis of 20072008. However,
the summary statistics only show the unconditional averages. When the dependent variables are
modeled conditional on the independent variables using the regression model, the time e¤ects
are no longer present. In addition, the results show no evidence that the ratio of total capital
to total assets (TcTa) is endogenous to risk, as measured by RwaTa, as the posterior mean of
12 is centered very close to zero, at the estimated posterior mean of 0.00064 with a posterior
standard deviation of 0.00096. This could also be the result of our exclusion restrictions being
weak. The exclusion restrictions NonTa and ROAA do not have strong e¤ects on RwaTa
or TcTa. However, the e¤ect of RwaTat 1 on RwaTat is very strong and signicant. This
implies serial correlation in our risk variable RwaTa; which is not surprising since it should
take time for a bank to change the risk composition of its held assets. We also nd that the
variance for the random e¤ects variables (i.e. 1 and 2) are small. As mentioned before
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we have also estimated a model with Chamberlains adjustment which could potentially reveal
that the random e¤ects are correlated with some regressors. However, we nd no evidence of
that being the case. Overall our estimated results suggest that there are no unobserved factors
driving total capital that would also a¤ect risk, and only factors exogenous to risk impacted
the large increases in the levels of total capital. However, this statement is only conditional on
the validity of our instruments.
The e¤ect of TcTa on RwaTa is centered at 0.165 with the standard deviation of 0.093 which
suggests that it is not very strong with the mean being separated from zero by less than two
standard deviations. However, Figure 1 shows that the posterior distribution of this parameter
is not symmetric and calculating the p-value or the probability that the estimated coe¢ cient
is greater than zero would give us a better idea with regards to the e¤ect strength of TcTa
on RwaTa. The calculated probabilities are given in the third column of Table 3 and for the
e¤ect of TcTa on RwaTa it is equal to 0.955 which corresponds to a p-value of 0.045. This is
a signicant e¤ect at a 5% level of signicance. The posterior distribution of this parameter
can also be interpreted as follows: even though the average e¤ect of TcTa on RwaTa over all
Islamic banks in the data set is not separated from zero by more than two standard deviations,
there is a considerable number of banks in the right tail of the support of the distribution
for which the e¤ect is clearly positive. This means that some Islamic banks in the data set
did adjust their portfolio towards more risky assets with potentially higher returns. This is
in line with the ndings of Ghosh (2014) and Karim et al. (2014), who nd higher exposure
to risks by Islamic banks in response to an increase in capital requirements. From a policy
perspective, such risk-taking need not be harmful for Islamic bankscapital position given their
PSIA feature, although PSIAs tend to be more volatile than conventional products. However,
compared to conventional markets, Islamic securities markets are much younger, shallower and
less developed. As a result, Sharia-compliant high-quality liquid assets (HQLAs) are short in
supply, thereby limiting opportunities for diversication for Islamic banks. In fact, this is a
long-standing problem in the Islamic nance industry see Vizcaino (2014) for further details.
The ratio of total equity to total asset (capital bu¤er, TeTa) has positive impacts on both
RwaTa and TcTa, though this e¤ect is only statistically strong for the TcTa equation with a
p-value of 0.047. The positive impact is in line with capital bu¤er theory (Milne and Whalley,
2001), which predicts that banksoptimal capital bu¤er is positively related to asset risk. These
ndings are also consistent with the stylized facts that Islamic banks (i) maintain a large liquidity
13
bu¤er to protect against deposit withdrawals (ii) restricted access to money markets (interbank)
and lender-of-last resort and (iii) have low leverage as they promote asset-backed investments.
Pappas et al. (2012) tied higher TeTa ratios (or low leverage) of Islamic banks to greater
survivorship and higher degrees of solvency, when compared with conventional banks.
We also nd that the ratio of bank loans to total assets (LoanTa) has a strong positive e¤ect
on RwaTa. Loans are the main source of revenue for Islamic banks. Since most of the loans are
in the form of prot and loss sharing, the nancial discipline imposed on entrepreneurs by debt
contracts can be weak (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This factor coupled with the equity-like
character of their bank loans may increase Islamic banksrisks by raising the uncertainty on
depositorsreturn and increasing the likelihood of both uninformed and informed bank runs
(Beck et al., 2013, p. 435). This is exacerbated by the fact that, generally, during a liquidity
crisis Islamic banks are less likely to cut lending compared to their conventional counterparts
(Beck et al., 2013). While it can be argued that the discipline imposed by depositors mitigates
risky bank lending (e.g., Diamond and Rajan, 2000) the reality is di¤erent for Islamic banks
which may face a higher withdrawal risk than their conventional counterparts. To minimize such
risk, on the liability side of the balance sheet Islamic banks tend to o¤er a competitive return
to their deposit (investment) account holders, while on the asset side Islamic banks may rely
more on non prot-sharing modes of nance (Abedifar et al., 2013). These actions although a
rational response in the face of weak contractual framework make Islamic banks more alike to
their conventional peers (Khan, 2010). It is worthwhile to mention here that after controlling
for di¤erences in bank-level, country-level macro and market indicators, and latent country
e¤ects, Islamic banks are shown to have a failure risk that is 55% lower than conventional
banks (Pappas et al., 2012).
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the e¤ect of changes in total capital on asset risks for 22 Islamic banks
observed over a 7 year period from 2007-2013. The nancial crisis of 2007-2008 resulted in
substantial increases in the total asset and capital levels. Our estimation results suggest that
these large changes in total capital have a noticeable e¤ect on the levels of riskiness of the
Islamic bank assets which become riskier. The use of TcTa = TCTA and RwaTa =
RWA
TA as
measures of total capital and risk is another contribution of this paper as it enables us to
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avoid the direct functional dependence between measures of bank capital and risk used in prior
studies, generated by the presence of risk weighted assets in both measures. Our approach is
more likely to identify the true treatment e¤ect rather than a spurious dependence. From a
regulatory/supervisory perspective, our ndings call to enhance the capital adequacy guidelines
for Islamic banks to more accurately reect their exposure to unique risks and their propensity
to increase risk when faced with increased capital requirements. Moreover, since meeting the
minimum capital required ratio is not a challenge for Islamic banks, greater emphasis should be
given on how Islamic banks manage their liquidity risk amid new liquidity ratios (i.e., Liquidity
Coverage Ratio and Net Stable Funding Ratio) under Basel III. We hope that these issues are
explored in future research.
15
Appendix 1: MCMC Algorithm
The full posterior distribution can be written as
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Steps of the MCMC procedure are as follows:
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6. The posterior distribution of the variance parameter 21 is inverse gamma, i.e.
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This completes the MCMC algorithm.
Appendix 2: Numerical Example and Monte Carlo Simulation
This section shows that the proposed MCMC algorithm produces reliable estimates. This can
be tested by generating data according to the known parameters of the data generating process.
We design a Monte Carlo simulation example for the studied random e¤ects treatment model
using 50 individuals, which are observed over 10 time periods. A new data set is generated at
each step of the Monte Carlo experiment and the posterior mean and standard deviations are
estimated. The covariates include two exogenous explanatory variables (k = 2), one endogenous
regressor, and one instrument (h = 1), each of which were generated from the random normal
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distribution, so that Xit1 = (1; xit1; xit2; yit2) and Xit2 = (1; xit1; xit2; zit2) in the model
yit1 = i1 + 10 + 11xit1 + 12xit2 + 1yit2 + "it1
yit2 = i2 + 20 + 21xit1 + 22xit2 + 2zit + "it2:
We follow the prior specications outlined in Section 3, and the random e¤ects were generated
as
ij  N(0; 2j ) j = 1; 2;
where 21 and 
2
2 were set to one to allow the random e¤ects to follow i.i.d. standard normal
distributions. The model parameters were set to 1 = (1; 1; 1); 1 = 0:5; 2 = (1; 1; 1); and
 = 0:5; and the idiosyncratic error terms "it1 and "it2 were generated using the bivariate
normal distribution with mean zero and variance-covariance matrix dened with the variance
parameters set to 2"1 = 1; "1"2 = 1; and 
2
"2 = 2; which implies very strong evidence of
endogeneity in y2:8
The Monte Carlo experiment was comprised of 500 Gibbs sampler simulations, meaning that
500 data sets were generated and 500 Markov chains were estimated. Each simulation consisted
of 5,000 iterations, following an initial 1,000 replication burn-in phase. Based on the Markov
chains the posterior means and standard deviations were calculated and collected. Table A.1
presents means of the posterior means and standard deviations for the model parameters based
on 500 observations. The results show that the distribution of the posterior means for all
model parameters are centered very close to their true values with relatively small margins of
error. In order to conrm that the MCMC results were not inuenced by the initial conditions,
multiple simulations using alternative starting values were also run (similar conclusions were
drawn and therefore these results were not reported). Overall the MCMC algorithm produces
reliable results.
8 =
"1"2q
2"1
2"2
 0:7
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Table A.1: Numerical example: Monte Carlo simulations
Variable True Value Mean SD
1 0.50 0.578 0.032
10 1.00 0.899 0.146
11 1.00 0.918 0.054
12 1.00 0.918 0.049
20 1.00 0.987 0.156
21 1.00 0.996 0.067
22 1.00 0.993 0.066
 1.00 1.069 0.057
Variance Parameters
1 1.00 0.963 0.203
2 1.00 0.937 0.215
21 1.00 0.872 0.073
22 2.00 1.983 0.133
12 1.00 0.778 0.082
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Table 1. Basel II and Basel III capital requirements, percent of risk-weighted assets
Basel II Basel III
A. Quantity of Capital
Minimum Total Capital 8.0 8.0
Capital Conservation Bu¤er n.a. 2.5
Minimum Total Capital Plus Conservation Bu¤er n.a. 10.5
Countercyclical Bu¤er n.a. 0-2.5
Global Systemically Import Banks (G-SIB) Surcharge n.a. 1-2.5
Minimum Total Capital Plus Conservation Bu¤er,
Countercyclical Bu¤er, & G-SIB Charge 8.0 11.5-15.5
Leverage Ratio n.a. 3.0
B. Quality of Capital
Minimum Common Equity Capital n.a. 4.5
Minimum Capital Instruments with Incentive to Redeem 4.0 6.0
Source: Dagher et al. (2016)
Table 2: Mean and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of variables
Variable 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Full Sample
Rwa (million US$) 487.46 591.15 741.54 810.51 927.15 966.93 754.13
(734:65) (767:00) (1; 131:65) (1; 202:74) (1; 299:18) (1; 369:94) (1; 096:95)
Ta (million US$) 9.46 10.19 11.79 13.10 15.31 16.59 12.74
(13:46) (13:84) (15:28) (16:96) (19:18) (20:64) (16:65)
RwaTa 71.27 89.84 62.71 60.59 60.78 58.53 67.29
(30:53) (126:18) (23:13) (21:57) (19:30) (17:47) (55:59)
ln(RwaTa) 4.12 4.15 4.04 4.02 4.03 3.99 4.06
(0:67) (0:74) (0:53) (0:48) (0:46) (0:50) (0:56)
Tc (million US$) 0.83 0.98 1.34 1.43 1.59 1.71 1.32
(1:24) (1:23) (2:04) (2:16) (2:38) (2:59) (2:00)
TcTa 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.13
(0:09) (0:159) (0:06) (0:06) (0:05) (0:04) (0:08)
Te (million US$) 1.30 1.34 1.48 1.52 1.71 1.96 1.55
(2:11) (2:09) (2:17) (2:23) (2:43) (2:75) (2:28)
TeTa 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12
(0:09) (0:08) (0:06) (0:06) (0:05) (0:04) (0:07)
Loan (million US$) 5.66 6.02 6.86 7.61 9.09 9.74 7.49
(8:23) (8:43) (9:12) (10:00) (11:60) (12:30) (10:00)
LoanTa 0.56 0.53 0.52 0.51 0.54 0.55 0.54
(0:17) (0:17) (0:17) (0:17) (0:17) (0:18) (0:17)
Nont 1 (million US$) 0.16 0.23 0.28 0.34 0.40 0.39 0.30
(0:25) (0:39) (0:45) (0:58) (0:61) (0:55) (0:48)
(NonTa)t 1 0.017 0.028 0.021 0.023 0.029 0.024 0.022
(0:015) (0:013) (0:010) (0:013) (0:025) (0:017) (0:019)
Roaa 0.009 0.003 0.007 0.005 0.012 0.012 0.008
(0:011) (0:017) (0:014) (0:020) (0:013) (0:017) (0:015)
Rwa (risk-weighted assets); Ta (total bank assets); RwaTa (ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets); Tc (total capital);
TcTa (ratio of total capital to total assets); Te (total equity); TeTa (ratio of total equity to total assets); Loan
(total bank loans); LoanTa (ratio of bank loans equity to total assets); Nont 1 (lagged nonperforming loans);
NonTat 1 (lagged ratio of nonperforming loans to total asset); Roaa (average return on assets).
24
Table 3. Posterior means and standard deviations of parameters
Variable Mean SD Pr(k > 0)
Dependent Variable: RwaTa
Intercept 0.326 0.100 0.988
2009 0.077 0.068 0.864
2010 -0.016 0.066 0.387
2011 0.040 0.063 0.709
2012 0.057 0.062 0.801
2013 0.020 0.062 0.608
TeTa 0.036 0.100 0.636
LoanTa 0.205 0.093 0.972
(NonTa)t 1 0.007 0.101 0.516
RwaTat 1 0.844 0.067 0.998
TcTa 0.165 0.093 0.955
Dependent Variable: TcTa
Intercept 0.032 0.237 0.674
2009 0.026 0.027 0.849
2010 0.002 0.022 0.563
2011 -0.004 0.020 0.446
2012 -0.015 0.019 0.211
2013 -0.020 0.018 0.135
TeTa 0.174 0.102 0.953
LoanTa 0.046 0.101 0.727
Roaa 0.014 0.099 0.554
TcTat 1 0.037 0.052 0.776
Variance Parameters
1 0.06506 0.07416 1
2 0.06310 0.04284 1
21 0.11027 0.03528 1
22 0.00487 0.00276 1
12 0.00064 0.00096 0.827
Figure 1. Posterior distribution of the e¤ect of TcTa on Risk parameter
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